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CoNsTITUnoNAL LA.w-DuE PRoCEss oF LA.w-FREEDOM FRoM UNREASON·
AnMissmILITY oF h.r.EGALLY SmZED EvrDENCE-Local police officers entered the private office of petitioner, a practising
physician, without a warrant and seized his private books and records. As a
result of the information thus obtained, petitioner was convicted of conspiracy
to perform an abortion. Petitioner claimed that his constitutional rights were
invaded contending that due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment
includes freedom from unreasonable search and seizure and prevents the admission
of illegally seized evidence, but this was denied by the Supreme Court of Colorado and the conviction was affirmed. 1 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States, held, affirmed, three justices dissenting. The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure by state officials, but does not forbid the admission of evidence
obtained in such illegal fashion. Wolf-v. Colorado (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 1359.
Four questions were raised by the principal case. The first was whether or
not the Fourth Amendment of the Bill of Rights is iµcluded in the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The contention that the due process
clause extends to all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights was once again rejected
by five members of the Supreme Court.2 Although this result has persistently
been reached, 3 the Court, using the gradual process of inclusion and exclusion,4
has ruled that such fundamental rights as fre~dom of speech, press, religion and
assembly are essential to due process.5 Protection accorded citizens against state
action is further broadened by the Court's holding in the principal case that the
substantive right guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment-freedom from unreasonable search and seizure-is now a part of the due process clause. 6 The majority opinion, written by Justice Frankfurter, stated that the security of one's
privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the local police is basic to a free society
and is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.7 The Court was not faced with
ABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE-THE

1 Wolf v. People of the State of Colorado, 117 Col. 279, 187 P. (2d) 926 (1947) and
117 Col. 321, 187 P. (2d) 928 (1947).
2 Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Reed and Burton.
3 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111 (1884); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67 S.Ct. 1672
(1947).
4 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
5 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925) (speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931) (press); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947) (religion); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255 (1937)
(assembly).
6 This is the first time that the Court has ever ruled directly on this question for it declined
in previous cases to pass upon the question, either because is was unnecessary for immediate
purposes, Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vennont, 207 U.S. 541, 28 S.Ct. 178 (1908) or
because there was no federal issue created, National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58,
34 S.Ct. 209 (1914).
.
7 Principal case at 1361.
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the question of what is an unreasonable search and seizure by a local officer,
since the search for petitioner's books and records for evidentiary purposes was
clearly illegal,8 but the Court will eventually have to decide whether uniform
standards of interpretation of search and seizure cases will be applied to both
federal and state action. 9 The remaining three questions involved the problem
of enforcing the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment under the due process
clause. The federal courts have consistently applied the rule that evidence
secured by federal officials through illegal search and seizure is inadmissible
against the person whose rights have been invaded.10 The second question before the _Court was whether this exclusionary rule is an intrinsic part of the
Fourth Amendment, or merely a judicial rule of evidence. There are no express
words in the amendment to classify the rule as a part thereof.11 Justification
for the rule has been sought either under the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights, which has been said to protect every person from incrimination by the
use of illegally seized evidence,12 or because exclusion is the only satisfactory
means of enforcing the safeguards of the Fourth Amendment.13 Furthermore,
the rule has not been restricted to questions of unreasonable search and seizure,
but it has been applied to illegal detention,14 wiretapping15 and to a variety of
other £.elds.16 Thus the majority of the Court logically held that the, rule was
not derived from the explicit requirements of the amendment, but that it was a

s Goulecl v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261 (1921); Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 1256 (1946).
9 The question of what is an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment has caused the Court much difficulty. See Davis v. United States, supra, note 8; Zap
v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S.Ct. 1277 (1946); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191 (1948); Lustig v. United States, (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 1372;
45 MICH. L. REv. 605 (1947). Conceivably a search by local officials could be valid under
local law but invalid under the due process clause.
lOBoyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524 (1886); Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341 (1914); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229
(1948). For a complete analysis of the rule see 58 YALB L. J. 144 (1948). This federal rule
of exclusion is contra to the common law rule that the illegal or irregular means of procuring
evidence is not cause for its rejection at trial. See 8 WmMoRB, EvroBNCB, 3rd ed., §2183
(1940).
11 See Hamo, ''Evidence Obtained by illegal Search and Seizure," 19 ill. L. REv. 303
(1925) and 42 MrcH. L. REv. 681 (1944).
12 Boyd v. United States, supra, note 10. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person
••• shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.•••"
13 Weeks v. United States, supra, note 10. See 45 MrcH. L. REv. 605, 614 (1947);
Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Umeasonable Searches and Seizures,'' 25 CcL. L. REv. 11 (1925); 58 Yale L. J. 144 (1948).
14 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 63 S.Ct. 608 (1943); Upshaw v. United
States, 335 U.S. 410, 69 S.Ct. 170 (1948).
15 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1927).
16 See 58 YALB L. J. 144, 149 (1948).
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matter of judicial implication-a rule of evidence laid down by the Supreme
Court which Congress could change if it so desired.17
The third question raised by the case was whether or not the admission of
illegally seized evidence, apart from its relationship to the Fourth Amendment,
was in itself a violation of due process of law. Traditionally the Supreme Court
has held that procedural due process of law requires that the accused receive
a fair trial in all respects and in all stages.18 Accordingly, at times a state cannot
deprive the accused of assistance of counsel,19 nor can it secure a conviction
based on perjured evidence20 or on a confession obtained by coercion.21 But
a common law jury22 and a grand jury indictment23 are not required, ngr is there
a prohibition against self-incrimination24 or double jeopardy.25 Thus there is no
basis for saying that the admission of illegally seized evidence, which is relevant
and reliable, is a departure from the fair trial concepts of due process as developed by the Court. 26 Petitioner's argument that_ due process was violated by
· the admission of the illegally seized evidence because the exclusionary rule was
vital to the protection of the right to be free from unreasonable search and
seizure presented the fourth question raised by the principal case. Such an extension of procedural due process beyond the area of fair trial requirements to
-include the disciplining of lawless stat~ officials was denied by the Court. Justice Frankfurter held that it was not for the Court to condemn, as falling below
the minimal standards assured by due process, a state's reliance on what he
characterized as other "equally effective" methods of protecting the right of
privacy.27 A rule rejected by thirty states, ten countries in the Br_itish Common-

17 Principal case at 1-361. Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, states that McNabb
v. United States, supra, note 14, is authority for holding it is a judicial rule of evidence. But
see Justice Rutledge's dissent in the principal case on p. 1368.
18 RonscHABFER, CoNSTITilTIONAL LAw, §327 (1939); Palko v. Connecticut, supra,
note 3.
19 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932). See 47 MxcH. L. REv. 705
(1949).
20 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935).
2 1 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 56 S.Ct. 461 (1936). See 46 MicH. L. REv;
1108 (1948).
22 Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448 (1900).
23 Hurtado v. California, supra, note 3-.
24 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908); Adamson v. California,
supra, note 3. See 46 MICH. L. REv. 372 (1948).
25 Palko v. Connecticut, supra, note 3.
26 State courts had previously held that it w~ not a denial of due process to admit such
evidence. Commonwealth v. Donnelly, 246 Mass. 507, 141 N.E. 500 (1923); Johnson v.
State;152 Ga. 271, 109 S.E. 662 (1921).
_27 Principal case at 1363. Possibly another reason for not incorporating the exclusionary
rule into due process would be the invalidation of laws of thirty states on the subject and the
nullification of the proceedings under these laws. See Adamson v. California, supra, note 3,
arid 46 MICH. L. REv. 372, 377 (1948).
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wealth,28 and criticized so strongly by legal wrifers,2 9 does not appear to be so
fundamental as to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and justice. In a
strong dissent Justice Murphy argued that without the exclusionary rule, the
protection to be accorded a citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment from unreasonable search and seizure is meaningless. 30 Self help, civil liability of the
officer in state courts,- or penal sanctions against the offending agent do not
appear to be equally as effective as the exclusionary rule.31 With the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment into the Fourteenth, the way is open for Congress to increase the effectiveness of the remedies available -to the aggrieved
party by passing federal criminal statutes aimed at state officers, or by permitting
civil actions against the local officials in the federal courts.32 If Congress passed
legislation expressly forbiddmg the admission of the illegal evidence in a state
court, it would raise a serious constitutional question as to whether Congress
could go this far in exercising its authority to enforce the rights judicially recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment. Clearly the holding by the Court in
the principal case is sound from a constitutional point of view, but the practical
effect of the decision seems to be that the inclusion of the Fourth Amendment
in the Fourteenth does not increase the protection a citizen previously had from
lawless searches and seizures by local officials.
Bernard Goldstone, S.Ed.

See charts in principal case at 1364 et seq.
Opposed to the rule: 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3rd ed., §§2183-4 (1940); Hamo, ''Evidence Obtained by illegal Search and Seizure," supra, note 11. Arguments in favor of the
rule: Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by illegal Searches and Seizures," supra,
note 13; Corwin, "The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self Incrimination Clause," 29
MicH. L. R:Ev. 1, 191 (1930); 45 MICH. L. R:Ev. 605 (1947).
_
30 Principal case at 1369. He was joined by Justice Rutledge, who also dissented
separately. Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissent.
31 Principal case at 1369, 1370. See Atkinson, "Admissibility of Evidence Obtained
Through Unreasonable Searches and Seizures," supra, note 13; CoRNEuus, SEARCH AND
SmzUREs, 2d ed., 44 (1930); 45 MICH. L. REv. 605 (1947); 58 Yale L. J. 144 (1948).
32 Art. 14, §5, states, "The Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legis- _
lation the provisions of this article." See RorrscHAEFER, CoNsnTUTIONAL LAw, §232
(1939).
28
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